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Vladik Kreinovich
Department of Computer Science
University of Texas at El Paso
El Paso, TX 79968, USA
email vladik@cs.utep.edu
Abstract
In this paper, we formalize and prove the statement that coincidences
cannot be accidental, a statement that underlies many useful heuristics in
mathematics and physics.
Our proof uses a version of Kolmogorov complexity, a technique originally developed to describe randomness and \accidentalness".

1 Coincidences are not Accidental: A Useful
Empirical Fact
Coincidences happen. In mathematics and physics, discoveries often start
when someone notices a strange coincidence. For example:

a large number that has some meaning in one theory is surprisingly equal
to the value that was obtained in another theory from quite dierent
reasons, or
the two functions, that have been dened in two dierent ways in two
dierent theories, surprisingly coincide, or
classications of two dierent kinds of objects turn out to be surprisingly
similar.
1

Coincidences are useful. Many mathematicians and physicists believe that
a coincidence cannot be accidental. So, a theory is created to explain this
\empirical" coincidence.

For example, a crucial point in the development of nineteenth-century
analysis was when Gauss observed that the value of a certain elliptic integral coincides with a number dened in a seemingly dierent way. This
coincidence lead him to a general theorem that explained this coincidence
and laid the foundation for an essential part of modern mathematics (for
a more detailed description of this situation, see, e.g., 1]).
Similarly, electromagnetic waves were discovered when it turned out that
a certain combination of parameters of Maxwell's equations coincides with
the velocity of light.
This kind of reasoning is still very fruitful nowadays. To our viewpoint, the
most interesting current example of such a fruitful coincidence is presented in
the introduction to 5] (see also 4, 10, 2]). The prime divisors of the largest
nonstandard simple group (called the \Monster") turned out to coincide with
the primes, for which some specic surface has genus 0 the minimal dimension
(196,883) in which this group can be realized as a natural transformation group
diers only by 1 from the smallest nontrivial coecient of a seemingly unrelated special mathematical function (called the normalized modular invariant
function), etc. All these coincidences, that may seem purely accidental at rst
glance, lead to a deep mathematical theory that combines:
nite groups,
Lie algebras, and
conformal quantum eld theory.

The rst 40 pages of the monograph 4] are literally lled with coincidences, so
that by the moment when the reader reaches page xl, she will agree with the
authors' phrase that \coincidences should not be taken lightly".
Coincidences-based heuristics work, but why? For many mathematicians
and physicists, there is no doubt that suciently nontrivial coincidences should
not be accidental. No doubt | but no general theorem as well.
The main goal of the present paper is to present a theorem explicitly saying
that coincidences are not accidental.
2

2 Towards a Mathematical Description of the
Problem
2.1 What is a coincidence?
The main idea is this: coincidence means that two dierent denitions lead to
the same object (number, function, classication, etc.).
To get more precise, let us remark that any denition of an object can
be articially made more complicated and still dene the same object. For
example, the number can be dened as the smallest positive real number x
for which sin(x) = 0. We can articially complicate this denition, e.g., by
taking an arbitrary true statement S (e.g., a formula stating that sin(y + z ) =
sin(y)  cos(z )+cos(y)  sin(z ) is true for all y and z ), and dene x as the smallest
positive real number for which sin(x) = 0 and the statement S is true.
In view of this possibility, it is not really surprising when the same object x
has two denitions of dierent length, one shorter and one longer. A true coincidence that deserves our attention is, therefore, when we have two (dierent)
denitions of the same length that dene the same object.

2.2 What does \not accidental" mean?
When we say that the coincidence between two dierently dened objects is
not accidental, we mean that there must exist a deeper explanation for this
coincidence. This \deeper explanation" may mean two things:
It may mean that within this same theory, there exists a third, simpler (=
shorter) denition of this same object x (thus explaining the two other
denitions as, kind of, complications of this shorter, more basic new denition),
It may also mean that there exists an alternative theory that is more
fundamental than the original theory, more fundamental in the sense that:
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{ each object that is denable in the old theory is also denable in the

new one
{ for each denition of an arbitrary object y in the old theory, there is
a denition of this same object in the new theory that is not more
complicated (= not longer) than the given denition in the old theory
and
{ at least one object has a simpler (= shorter) denition in the new
theory.

2.3 To formalize the above idea, we must describe what
\de nable" means

What \denable" means: in short. The above description uses the word

\denable object", \length of the denition", etc. Usually, we say that a formula
F (x) with one free variable denes an object x if x is the only object that makes
this formula true, i.e., if:

F (x) is true for this object x, and
F (y) is false for every other object y 6= x.

Auxiliary notions that we need to formalize to dene what \denable"
means. Thus, to formally dene this notion, we must describe:
what an object is,
what a formula with one free variable is, and what a statement (without
free variables) is
what is the result of applying a formula F (:) with one free variable to an
object x and
when is a statement (formula without free variables) true.

Preliminary remark: we must x the alphabet. Objects, formulas, and
statements are all representable by sequences of symbols (\words") in a certain
alphabet. So, we will assume that some nite alphabet is xed, and objects,
formulas, statements, etc., are words in this alphabet.
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Describing the set of true statements. Let us rst describe the set of true

statements.
In mathematics, to describe which statements are true and which are not,
we usually describe two things:
we describe axioms, i.e., statements that we initially assume to be true,
and
we describe deduction rules, i.e., rules that enable us to go from some
statements, which are already known to be true, to new true statements.
For example, if the alphabet contains \and" & with its usual meaning,
then from the truth of A and B we can deduce that the statement A&B
is also true.
In mathematical logic, this combination of axioms and deduction rules is usually
called a theory. When a theory is given, this means that we can eventually
generate all possible true statements:
we start with the axioms
we apply all applicable deduction rules to the axioms, and thus get new
statements that are true
we apply all applicable deduction rules to thus enlarged set of true statements, and, hopefully, conclude that some other statements are true
etc.
Thus, the set of all true statements possesses an algorithm that generates, one
by one, all the elements of this set (this set may be innite, so it may take
innitely long to generate all the elements from this set). In mathematical logic
and theory of computing, such sets are called recursively enumerable (r.e., for
short).
There exist more complicated methods of describing a theory, but in all these
methods, the set of true statements is r.e.
So, by a set of true statements, we will mean a r.e. set of words.
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What are formulas and statements? Some theories have an additional al-

gorithmic property that they are decidable, i.e., that there exists an algorithm
that, given a statement, checks whether this statements is true or not. Most
non-trivial theories are not decidable. But even in these theories, while it is algorithmically impossible to check whether a statement is true or not, it is usually
algorithmically possible (and easy) to determine whether a given combination
of symbols is indeed a correctly build statement.
E.g., in the rst order theory of real numbers, one can easily check that
9x(x  x = x) is a grammatically correct statement, while 9x(x = is not.
Thus, by a set of statements, we will mean a decidable subset of the set of
all words. Similarly, the set of all formulas with one free variable is another
decidable subset of the same set of all words (that does not intersect with the
rst one).
Only statements (i.e., formulas without free variables) can be true a formula
F (:) with a free variable can be true or false depending on what we apply it to.

What are objects. Objects are usually dened as constructions that satisfy

certain properties. Usually, we have an algorithm that generates all possible
objects e.g., the set of all natural numbers can be dened if we start with 0
and 1 and add 0's and 1s. Thus, we will dene the set of all objects as a r.e.
set of words.
In some cases, this set is decidable, but we do not want to lose generality,
so, we will not impose this additional requirement.
Substitution. If we have a formula F (:) with one free variable, and an object
x, then we can substitute the object x into the formula F (:) and get a statement
F (x) (i.e., a formula with no free variables). Substitution is an algorithmic
(and easy) operation, so, we will assume that there exists an algorithm that
transforms a pair, consisting of a formula with one free variable and an object,
into a statement (i.e., into a formula without free variables).
Now, we are ready for the formal denitions.
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3 Denitions and the Main Result
Denition 1. Let a nite set A be given. This set will be called an alphabet,
and its elements will be called symbols.

An arbitrary nite sequence of symbols will be called a word. The set of
all words will be denoted by W .
For each word w 2 W , we will denote its number of symbols (length) by
len(w).
By a language, we mean a tuple L = hA F  S  O subi, where:

{ F is a decidable subset of the set W  its elements will be called
formulas with one free variable, or simply formulas

{ S is a decidable subset of the set W for which F \S =  elements of
the set S will be called formulas without free variables, or statements
{ O is a r.e. subset of the set W  its elements will be called objects

and
{ sub : F O ! S is an algorithmic (computable) function that transforms each pair (F x), where F 2 F and x 2 O, into a statement
sub(F x) 2 S  for simplicity, we will also denote sub(F x) by F (x).

Denition 2. Let a language L = hA F  S  O subi be given.
By a theory, we mean a r.e. subset T S .
We say that a statement S 2 S is true in a theory T if S 2 T .
We will say that a formula F 2 F is true for an object x if the statement
F (x) is true (i.e., if F (x) 2 T ).
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Denition 3. Let a language L = hA F  S  O subi be given, and let T be a
theory.

We say that a formula F with one free variable denes an object x if x is
the only object for which this formula is true, i.e., if

{ F (x) is true for this x, and
{ F (y) is not true for any other object y 6= x.
If a formula F 2 F denes an object x, we say that the formula F is a
denition of the object x.

We say that an object is denable in a theory T if it has a denition in
this theory.
We say that a theory T is non-trivial if innitely many objects are denable
in this theory.
We say that a denition F is simpler than the denition F if len(F ) <
len(F ).
0

0

We say that a denition F is not more complicated than the denition F
if len(F ) len(F ).

0

0

Denition 4. Let a language L be xed. We say that a theory T is more
0

fundamental than the theory T if the following three conditions are satised:

each object that is denable in the theory T is also denable in the theory
T
0

for each denition F of an arbitrary object y in the theory T , there is
a denition F of this same object in the theory T that is not more
complicated than F 
0

0

that there exists an object y and its denition in T that is easier than
any of denitions of this object y in the theory T .
0

8

Theorem. Let L = hA F  S  O subi be a language, and let T be a non-trivial
theory in this language L. If in this theory, an object x has two dierent denitions F 6= F of the same length (len(F ) = len(F )), then:
0

0

either in this same theory T , there exists a third denition F of the object
x that is simpler that the given two,
00

or there exists a theory T that is more fundamental than T .
0

Comment. This is exactly what we wanted to prove.

The actual proof (as well as its relation with Kolmogorov complexity) is
presented in the Appendix to this paper.
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Appendix: Proof and its Relation to Kolmogorov Complexity
A1. Proof

In order to prove the theorem, let us rst re-formulate it. What out

theorem basically says is that if in some non-trivial theory T , an object x has
two dierent denitions F 6= F of equal length and no simpler (=shorter)
denitions, then there exists another theory T that is more fundamental than
T.
Auxiliary result. To construct the desired new theory T , let us rst show
that in T , there exists an object whose shortest possible denition is longer than
len(F ).
0

0

0
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Indeed:
On one hand, there are nitely many words of length len(F ), and thus,
only nitely many dierent objects can be dened by such \short" formulas.
On the other hand, the theory T is assumed to be non-trivial, in the sense
that innitely many objects are denable in this theory.
Therefore, there exist an object z whose every denition in T is longer than F .

Construction of a new theory. Since the formula F denes x, we conclude
that F (x) 2 T and F (z ) 62 T . Let us now dene T by replacing F (x) with
0

0

0

0

0

F (z ) in the theory T .
It is easy to check that T is a r.e. set, i.e., a theory.
0

0

Three conditions that we need to prove in order to show that the
new theory is more fundamental. Let us show that T is indeed more
0

fundamental than T . According to the denition of a more fundamental theory,
we must prove three things:
that each object that is denable in the theory T is also denable in the
theory T 
0

that for each denition F of an arbitrary object y in the theory T , there
is a denition F of this same object in the theory T that is not more
complicated than F  and
0

0

that there exists an object y and its denition in T that is easier than
any of denitions of this object y in the theory T .
0

Proving the rst condition. Let us rst prove the rst condition, that each
object that is denable in the theory T is also denable in the theory T . Indeed:
0
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The object x is denable in T , namely, it is denable by the property F .
Indeed:
0

{ F (x) is still true (i.e., 2 T ), and
{ for every y 6= x, F (y) is still not true.
The object z is denable by the formula F . Indeed, since the formula F
was dening x in the original theory T , the only statement of the type
F (y) in the set T was the term F (x). When we constructed T , we
replaced this statement with F (z ). Thus, the only statement of the type
F (y), which is now (in T ) true, is F (z ). Hence, in the new theory, the
formula F denes the object z .
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Every other object y 6= x, y 6= z , which was dened in T by some formula
F , is dened in T by this same formula.
00

0

Proving the second condition. Let us now show that for each denition F

of an arbitrary object y in the theory T , there exists a denition F of this same
object in the theory T that is not more complicated than F :
0

0

Let us rst prove this fact for the object x. We have assumed that in T ,
formulas F and F are the shortest denition of x (of equal length). Since
the formula F still denes x in the new theory T , this denition is, thus,
not longer than any denition of x in the original theory T .
0

0

For z , the new theory has a denition F of length len(F ), while any
denition in the old theory T was longer. Thus, for old denition, there
is indeed a new simpler (= shorter) one.
0

For every other object y 6= x, y 6= z , every formula F that denes y in
the theory T denes the same object in the new theory and therefore, the
new denition is not longer than the old one.

Proving the third condition. While proving the second condition, we also
proved that for the object z , the formula F that denes this object T is easier
than any of the formulas that dene this same object in the original theory T .
The theorem is proven. Three conditions are proven. Thus, the theory T
is indeed more fundamental than T . The theorem is proven.
0

0

0
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A2. Relation to Kolmogorov complexity

Similarity. In our proof, for an object x, we considered the shortest length

len(F ) of a formula that denes this object:

d(x) = minflen(F ) j F denes xg:
Thus dened notion is very similar to the notion of Kolmogorov complexity
(see, e. g., 9]): the Kolmogorov complexity K (x) of an object x is dened
as the shortest length of a program that computes x. To get our notion from
Kolmogorov complexity, we must:
replace programs with formulas, and
replace computing with dening.

Similarity explained. The similarity between our notion and Kolmogorov

complexity is not accidental:

one of the main objectives of introducing the notion of Kolmogorov complexity was to formalize the notions of randomness, \accidentalness" (see,
e.g., physical applications in 9, 6, 7, 8, 3], and
formalizing of \accidentalness" is exactly what we are interested in.

Possible research directions. In view of the meaningfullness of our analogue

of Kolmogorov complexity, it may be desirable to analyze this analogue as the
Kolmogorov complexity itself has been analyzed 9]. Hopefully, this analysis
will lead to new physically meaningful applications.
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